Abstract: How have India's Supreme Court judges behaved towards minorities detained under anti-terror laws? Do judges make distinctions between the religious and political affiliations of the accused in anti-terror cases? If so, why, and under what conditions? The paper investigates these questions through a probability analysis of anti-terror cases.
Introduction
"It is very difficult to assess the Supreme Court's role in the area of civil liberties…The Court has, however, permitted the extensive curtailment of the individual's rights…Over the years, no consistent and overall policy is discernable. It seems as if the Court acts on an ad hoc basis with a different emphasis on policy in different cases. It is doubtful if a consistent and evolutionary trend of decisions on civil liberties is in the offing." (Rajeev Dhavan, Judges on Trial, 1980) Does the Indian legal scholar Dhavan's statement hold true today? How have India's Supreme Court judges behaved towards minorities on antiterror cases? Do judges make distinctions between the religious and political affiliations of the accused in anti-terror cases? If so, why, and under what conditions? The paper investigates these questions through a probablity analysis of anti-terror cases.
Why is it important to assess judicial behaviour on anti-terror laws in democracies facing wars on terror and secessionism? The 9/11 attacks triggered stringent anti-terror laws in old and new democracies like the US, UK, Spain, India, and Turkey, among others. 1 Anti-terror laws typically target minority groups: the Patriot Act arguably targets Islamic militancy, while India's Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act was enacted to deal with Sikh secessionism. " [The] Country was lulled into the belief that the police must be armed in that strategic part of India to suppress Pakistan-prodded terrorists…Instead law was made applicable to whole of India and upheld in Kartar Singh," said former Justice Krishna Iyer. Civil rights activists allege that Sikhs and Muslims are unfairly targeted by India's anti-terror laws, echoing the criticism of the US Patriot Act. In the western state of Gujarat (a site of violent religious riots in the last two decades), Muslims were 9% of the population but accounted for a quarter of all jail inmates in the state. 2 Democratic states pride themselves on an impartial rule of law that does not discriminate against minorities. In the fight against terrorism, states face the dilemma of balancing security with liberty. As Waldron (2003) points out, any balance includes the possibility that the liberties of few could be held hostage to the security of the majority, that the invasive power of the state could increase, that the consequent security could be more symbolic rather than real. Terrorism induces higher levels of insecurity and greater willingness on the part of citizens to allow legislatures to enact laws even allowing secret trials, detention without trial, surveillance and even torture. Public fear of terrorist attacks may make majority opinion tilt towards security concerns at the expense of civil liberties, but the judiciary is supposed to be the last bastion when all other institutions succumb to prejudice. Is it? Have the judges balanced the demands of security with obligations of democracy?
An assessment of the Indian Supreme Court on anti-terror cases is instructive because it sheds light on the challenges faced by judges in poor and multi-religious democracies. Indian judges have to walk a difficult path between upholding a constitutional mandate of parliamentary (and majoritarian) primacy in emergency laws, and ensuring fair treatment to religious minorities. India is the world's most populous parliamentary democracy with "the most powerful court in the world" following a common law system, with a large Muslim minority with a complicated history of strife with the Hindu majority, and experienced secessionist movements in Kashmir, the North East and Punjab. Polarization of Hindus and Muslims increased in recent decades with a resurgence of Hindu nationalism and a Hindu nationalist BJP led coalition government from 1998-2004. India is also one of the few countries that allows preventive detention laws to operate in peacetimea legacy of the fact that the constitution was created during a violent partition of the country into India and Pakistan.
Traditional explanations that focus on the law, ideology of judges, preferences of political regimes, or institutional goals only partially explain the pro-minority behaviour of Indian Supreme Court evident in the econometric model. My approach sees judges as negotiators, embedded in institutional, political and societal contexts. Within the scope of the laws, judgments reflect a judge's negotiation with the political (single party or coalition) and societal (public approval or displeasure with judges; crisis or non-crisis) environments. The judiciary as an institution mediates these influences. The empirical econometric model demonstrates that a post-Emergency judiciary (as compared to pre-Emergency judges) is more likely to support vulnerable minorities particularly during coalition regimes. The mechanism driving an embedded negotiator approach is the presence or absence of a judicial institutional crisis of legitimacy. This, in conjunction with increased operational judicial independence produces more protection for vulnerable minorities.
The second section assesses conventional explanations of judicial behaviour; the third section outlines the embedded negotiator approach; the fourth section provides a profile of the Indian Supreme Court; the fifth section discusses the empirical evidence for our approach and the final section highlights the implications for theories about law, terrorism and democracy. The legal model holds that judges make decisions based on the facts of the case including the language of the law, intentions of the framers of those laws, precedents established in previously decided cases and a balancing of societal interests. Ronald Dworkin distinguishes between justice (a quality of the outcomes of a decision process), fairness (a quality of the structure of that decision procedure), and procedural due process (right procedures for judging whether some citizen has violated laws laid down by political procedures). 3 Judges, according to Dworkin, must often compromise commitments to fairness and justice by finding a fit with settled law. This model assigns law (and judges) with the task of acting as a neutral guardian of the boundary between state and civil society. 4 So in anti-terror cases, if the laws mandate stringent and abridged due process, the courts will approve these measures. For instance, the Indian Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of confessions to a police officer under TADA. 5 The legal approach is right in emphasizing the importance of law, but apart from precedent, it is hard to test the empirical validity of the approach. Several (Segal and Spaeth, 1993; Dotan, 2003) question the assumption of constitutional passivity and ideological neutrality of courts. Even precedents are problematic because one can find multiple precedents, and there is no guarantee that all judges will use the same precedent or view a precedent in the same way. For instance, as a famous constitutional scholar (Seervai 1983) pointed out, India's Supreme Court judges were confused about the precedent set by a 1950 judgment on preventive detention. 6 Our analysis shows that judges did not distinguish between cases dealing with village feuds and those pertaining to the security of the state (see the model).
b) Ideological preference of a judge (Attitudinal Model)
Attitudinalists emphasize the importance of non-legal influences on a judge's decision. "What explains why judges, at least those on the U.S. Supreme Court, decide cases the way they do? To answer this question we need to focus on judges' decisions rather than on the reasons they give in their opinions for deciding the way they have. Thirdly, judicial norms discourage dissenting opinions, which makes it hard to understand the ideological biases of individual judges. 9 Finally, the American versions of liberal and conservative do not apply in India.
As constitutional scholar Upendra Baxi noted:
"The ideological universe of Indian Supreme Court Justices is not easy to discover and delineate, so extraordinarily varied are their tenures and the nature of cases and controversies coming before them for adjudication. The lack of a dissenting tradition aggravates the task. And it is difficult to get at the deep structure of decisions, especially in constitutional adjudication, without a mature grasp of regressive and progressive tendencies in politics of the time. Perhaps it is not useful to pursue research primarily directed at demonstrating which model of judicial behaviour is right. Rather, as
Whittington (2000) rightly argues, the results are most compelling when they are explaining particular empirical arguments rather than when they are used to make broad claims about the superiority of a universal model of judicial behavior. How does the embedded negotiator approach play out in an anti-terror case? In writing the judgment, judges have to walk the path between deference to the political system and judicial autonomy, between outlining workable solutions and capturing the spirit of constitutional rights. They have to create a balance between overstating the problem and losing authority because of non-compliance by the executive and bureaucracy, and understating the solutions and losing the respect of the public. This is more than a modus vivendi argued by Mehta (2005) who says that most judgments "are a delicate and political balancing of competing values and political aspirations; they seek to provide a 15 ADM Jabalpur v Shiv Kant Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 52 workable modus vivendi rather than articulate high values." 16 We expect that judges will be more careful when minorities are in the dock. As embedded negotiators, judges are aware of the limits but also use the opportunities created by the tension between these elements. For instance, sections of the ruling coalition may favour more anti-Muslim verdicts but judges may use the coalition nature of the regime to give more pro-Muslim verdicts.
Profile of India's Supreme Court and Anti-Terror Laws
A Supreme Court judge in India still comes from a middle class, Hindu, professional family, armed with an LLB and some experience as a lawyer for a state government before entering the High Court. However, top legal minds prefer to be lawyers rather than judges. 17 Judges were predominantly male (97%) and Hindu (87%). Over 80% belonged to the forward castes, and only 6% came from the backward castes. 13% of the judges were from other religious groups. The northern region accounted for 33% of judges, followed by the south (27%), east (23%) and west (15%). Only 27% of judges had masters level education -13 judges had LLMs, and 19 judges had MAs. The rest of the judges had completed their bachelors degree followed by an LLB. Only 13% of the judges had a foreign degree (mainly from England); the rest were trained in India. Very few judges entered politics after retiring. Some chief justices headed the National Human Rights Commission for a fixed term after retiring from the court.
16 Mehta (2005) , p. 170 17 To qualify for appointment as a Supreme Court judge, a person must be an Indian citizen, and must be either a distinguished jurist, a high court judge for at least five years, or an advocate of a high court for at least ten years (Article 124(3)). According to the Constitution, to qualify for appointment as a High Court judge, a person must be a citizen of India and have held a judicial office in the territory of India or been an advocate of a High Court or of two or more such courts in succession (Article 217 (2)). As far as the higher judiciary is concerned, these professional criteria are followed. But the fact remains that for quite sometime the best talent in the legal profession is not available for judicial appointment (Dhavan, 1980) . (2005) points out that a government affidavit in 1993 during the Second Judges case said of 575 appointments, the government had rejected the Chief Justice's opinion in only a handful of cases. Also see Gupta (1997) Decision-making in the Supreme Court, New Delhi, Kaveri Books. Gupta shows that of the sixty nine appointments studied more than half of those elevated were chief justices. 22 The Right to Information Act now allows citizens to ask for information on the process by which judges were selected for the High Court and the Supreme Court. 23 After losing two important constitutional cases in 1970 and 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi dissolved the Parliament. She returned to power with a large enough majority to enable her pass several amendments. Indira Gandhi passed the 24 th and 25 th amendments which sought to reduce the level of judicial review of legislation, particularly those pertaining to some Directive Principles (Article 39b and c). These amendments were challenged in Keshavananda Bharati v State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461, where the majority held that the Parliament could not alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. See Seervai (1983) Dhavan's observations with which this paper began is not valid today.
We can test the influences of the political, social and personal influences on the probability of a judge deciding for or against the state and spell out the trends of judicial behaviour. We use the probit technique to measure discrete political variables where an event either occurs or it does not. For instance, in anti-terror cases where the government is a litigant, the outcome is either pro-state or anti-state. The model gives us the level of significance i.e. p less than .10 or .05. which means that there are only 10 or five chances in a hundred that the relation between a Hindu judge and anti-state judgments would occur by chance; there is at least a 90% or 95% probability that the relationship is not simply due to chance. 24 The model, which holds other variables constant, allows us to test the relative importance of the three elements -legal, political and public concerns -in determining the behaviour of judges.
We constructed a new variable, 'verdict', which combined two variables:
a) The judgment was upheld when the plaintiff was the state b) The judgment was dismissed when the defendant was the state.
To test our hypotheses we collected information about Supreme Court cases registered under anti-terror laws; a profile of these cases; a profile of all the judges involved in these cases; data on the political parties in power when the judges were appointed, and when the judgments were delivered; and presence or absence of a national crisis in this time period. 25 In order to assess changes in behaviour induced by the Emergency, we also collected data on preventive detention cases before the emergency.Our database comprises all Supreme Court judgments on preventive detention, TADA and POTA from 1950 -June 2006.
24 Epstein (1995) 25 The Manupatra database from which I drew the cases, has 80%-90% of the judgments reported in the official Supreme Court Recorder.
Results
If the embedded negotiator approach is valid, we expect to find the following patterns in anti-terror cases:
a) Law matters
Overall, judges are more likely to give pro-state judgments because of the constitutional emphasis on security over the rights of detainees.
Supreme Court judges favoured the state in 54% of the cases and invariably upheld the right of parliament to make draconian laws. 26 Lower court judges were even more likely to support the state -a fact reflected in our dataset where the state was the defendant in 93% of the cases. 27 Judges interpreted the laws in line with what they saw as the intent of the constituent assembly -fundamental rights were hedged in by restrictions imposed on grounds of national emergency to be determined by the parliament, and legal rights were suspended in cases dealing with state security.
26 Of the 193 cases, judges favoured the state in 105 cases and the accused in 88 cases. 27 While special courts or the High court functioned as trial courts for anti-terror cases, appeals and constitutional challenges to the anti-terror laws were heard by the Supreme Court. Cases involving security threats and explosives were more likely to be decided in favour of the state as compared to criminal cases and others, supporting the view that judges display an institutional tendency to support the state in the face of security threats. However, judges went an extra mile and gave the benefit of doubt to the state by upholding the conviction of people involved in village feuds even though TADA was not applicable in such cases. This finding has a significant implication for the way the state frames the cases. If the state prosecution framed the case as a 'security' threat, the state was more likely to be the winner. It 30 I used the description of the case given by the judge. If the judgment said that the case involved a village feud that did not threaten the security of the state, it was coded as "village feud". For instance, a eyewitnesses confirmed that the accused shot a man with an AK-47 gun to take his tractor. Or a man in a village shot his neighbour with a gun for which he did not have a license. In several cases, the court pointed out that the issue was criminal (gang warfare); the police used anti-terror laws to detain criminals; these cases were coded as "criminal". Other cases that involved security threats to the state through the use of explosives, and arms and ammunition were coded as "security". Technically, anti-terror laws were supposed to be used for cases in the 'security' category.
Probit: Judges and Pro-State verdicts
would be instructive to assess whether the shift towards pro-state verdicts after 2001 were because the cases were framed as security threats. Over half the security cases came after 2001, of which 33 cases went in favour of the state. This implies a worrying trend for civil liberties if the shift occurred because the cases were framed as security threats.
The over-use of these laws against non-security related cases debunks the emphasis by many on the need for strong anti-terror laws.
But the laws also offered opportunities, which judges found. A significant percentage (45%) of all judgments were anti state. Judges seized opportunities within the legal framework to craft judgments that carried legitimacy with litigants from religious and political minorities.
Evidence for Mechanism Driving the Embedded Negotiator Approach
Our approach predicts that post-emergency judges will support even apologised to the public (much later) saying that he wished he had the courage to resign during the trial.
The empirical data provides strong evidence for the mechanism underlying the embedded negotiator model, namely the post-emergency institutional move to reclaim legitimacy. After the Emergency, we expect increased scrutiny of cases involving minorities, regardless of the level of judicial independence produced by the political configuration. 32 The only way they could recover public legitimacy within the limits of the laws and the political environment was to negotiate a public image as a protector of vulnerable groups without enraging the government.
TADA and POTA targeted militancy in Punjab and Kashmir, making
Sikhs and Muslims more vulnerable to these laws. Let us examine the data on the behaviour of judges towards Muslims and Sikhs as compared to Hindus. In the anti-terror cases (preventive detention, TADA and POTA), Muslims and Sikhs comprised 25% and 22% respectively of the litigants. 33 Our model allows us to examine the probability of judges favouring or targeting minorities irrespective of the size of the sample. We expect to find the following trends:
(i) Judgments by post-emergency judges will be more anti-state than those by pre-emergency judges. Judges were more likely to be suspicious of the state in TADA cases as compared to preventive detention and POTA cases, indicating a shift by post-emergency judges towards protecting vulnerable groups. 34
32 One could argue that the Congress regime was indifferent to anti-terror verdicts when minorities were involved because Muslims formed part of the Congress vote bank in the 1980s. 33 Of the 120 TADA cases, only 57 favoured the state; of 65 PD cases, 42 favoured the state; and of 8 POTA cases, 6 favoured the state Our dataset had 51 Muslim plaintiff/defendants, 43 Sikhs, 97 Hindus, and 3 others. 34 I ran a probit with the years of experience as judges, Muslim litigant, and preventive detention cases, and also included the interactions between these variables. Gujarat and Kerala. 35 In Maharasthra, their share was 10.6% , while their share of total prison inmates was 32.4%, and rose to 40.6% of those in prison for under a year. In Gujarat, the percentage of Muslims in the state was 9.06% but they made up over a quarter of all jail inmates. Civil rights activists contend that the disproportionate share of Muslims in prisons was because of prejudiced police, high poverty, and lack of opportunities including poor access to legal aid.
How do we test for this objection? Judges, when dismissing cases, highlight the flimsiness of the evidence and/or procedural irregularities.
One of the reasons given in upholding or dismissing a case was whether circumstantial evidence was proven or not. Let us assume that the evidence was flimsy if circumstantial evidence was not proven. Of the 75 instances of poor circumstantial evidence and due process not followed, only a quarter had Muslim litigants, which also reflected their proportion in the entire sample. So cases with Muslims were not more likely to be dismissed for flimsy evidence.
A second interpretation is that judges saw cases against Muslims as being more politically charged and hence requiring more scrutiny. How This is because the situation in Punjab has now admittedly improved very much and peace has come back to that region. Therefore, it is not necessary in this case to award a sentence beyond the minimum fixed by the statute. We, therefore, reduce the sentence of imprisonment to five years as for each of the appellants." 38
The harsh attitude towards Kashmiri militants could be because unlike Khalistani separatism which was treated more as a law and order issue and tackled primarily by the police, the Indian army was deployed against Kashmiri militants. Despite the deployment of the Indian army in Punjab on several occasions including Operation Bluestar and Black 36 I examined the judgment and if the judge linked the litigant to Kashmiri, Khalistani, extremism (Naxalite and other forms), then I coded the litigant as having a political affiliation. Otherwise, I coded it as "no affiliation". This allows us to judge the judges on the basis of their statements without including one's own opinions. We had information on political affiliation drawn from the judgments for 104 cases (about 50% of our cases anti-terror cases were more likely to change their mind as compared to judges who decided fewer cases. This indicates that judges more experienced in anti-terror cases are less dogmatic about supporting or opposing the state. They seem to view the facts of the case on its own merits rather than coming to it with pre-conceived positions.
c) Public environment matters. Our evidence has some worrying implications for the debates on the need for anti-terror legislation. The inability of the judges to distinguish between village feuds and security-of-the-state type cases is worrying, and the over-use by the state of these laws against non-security related cases debunks the emphasis by many on the need for strong anti-terror laws. Only 42% of the cases tried under the three anti-terror laws involved some threat to the security of the state.
The evidence suggests that even in overburdened courts struggling with over-use of anti-terror legislation, judges can and do protect vulnerable groups. It is harder to pin down where this attitude comes from. An embedded negotiator approach helps us understand that judges are not insulated from politics or society, rather they are susceptible to the fluctuating influences of political machinations, public opinion and national crisis. If anything, the one certain thing about Indian judges is that they are more likely engage in a constant process of negotiation and adopt flexible positions. Judges think about their roles and grow into them. What I show here is that such a process exists. For instance, our model shows that the more cases a judge hears, the more likely he is to change his mind implying a lower level of dogmatism. Whether judges decide to protect some minorities seems to depend on their need to generate legitimacy for their rulings. This imperative functions more strongly after the institution experiences a crisis of legitimacy driven by its abandonment of civil liberties.
